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ABSTRACT
Scholars have distinguished career from recognition judiciaries, largely arguing that they reflect different
legal cultures and traditions. We start by noting that the career/recognition distinction does not
correspond perfectly to the civil law/common law distinction, but rather that there are pockets of each
institutional structure within regimes that are dominated by the other type. We discuss the causes and
implications of this phenomenon, arguing that institutional structure is better explained through a
theory of judicial reputation/legitimacy than through a theory of legal origin or tradition. We provide
some preliminary empirical support for our account.
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I.

INTRODUCTION.

Comparative lawyers have contrasted the “career” and “recognition” models of judicial organization.1
The career judiciary, in which judges join the judiciary at a young age and remain there for their entire
careers, refers to the system prevalent in most though not all civil law jurisdictions.2 The recognition
judiciary, in which judges are appointed later in life in recognition of other career achievements, is
frequently associated with the U.S. and most common law jurisdictions.3

The career and recognition systems are usually seen as involving a cluster of institutional characteristics
that reinforce each other. For example, in career judiciaries: (1) Judges are initially appointed to junior
positions either in trial courts or assisting senior judges; (2) Judges are promoted to senior positions at
later stages, culminating in positions on the supreme court; (3) Tenure is not attached to a particular
position but to the entire career; and (4) Transfers to courts of equal seniority are generally allowed.4
Frequently, the appointment mechanisms used in civil law jurisdictions insulate career judiciaries from
political considerations, sometimes through the use of powerful judicial councils to mediate between
politics and judicial management.5 Furthermore, many civil law jurisdictions have created and developed
judicial training institutes to train young lawyers who opt for a career in the judiciary, reinforcing the
image of judging as a distinct profession.

Recognition judiciaries, by contrast, tend to include the following institutional features: (1) Judges are
selected after an initial career related to the legal professions; (2) Judges are not usually promoted; (3)
Tenure is in many cases for life, and is attached to a specific court, and (4) transfers to courts of equal
seniority rarely occur.6 A recognition judiciary tends to rely on appointment mechanisms that involve
1

See, among others, Nicholas Georgakopoulos, , Independence in the Career and Recognition Judiciary. University
of Chicago Law School Roundtable 7: 205 (2000).
2
Scandinavian jurisdictions are exceptional in this regard. For a short summary of the current selection practices in
Scandinavian countries (including the ongoing reform in Sweden), see
http://internationallawobserver.eu/2010/04/21/reform‐of‐the‐judiciary‐in‐sweden‐%E2%80%93‐the‐procedure‐
for‐selection‐and‐appointment‐of‐judges/ (last checked: June 3, 2011).
3
See Richard Posner, Law and Legal Theory in England and America (1996).
4
Id.
5
See, for a general discussion, Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Guarding The Guardians: Judicial Councils and
Judicial Independence, American Journal of Comparative Law 57: 103‐134 (2009) and Nuno Garoupa and Tom
Ginsburg, The Comparative Law and Economics of Judicial Councils, Berkeley Journal of International Law 27: 52‐82
(2009).
6
Quoting from J. Mark Ramseyer and Minoru Nakazato, Japanese Law: An Economic Approach (1999, U Chicago
Press): “Where an American judge might be appointed to the Northern District of Illinois, a Japanese judge is not
appointed anywhere. Instead, he is simply a judge.”
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the other branches of government, and therefore are usually more politicized in nature (including the
use of direct election in some states of the U.S.).7 A position in the judiciary does not demand any
particular previous training or experience as a judge.8

The distinction between career judiciaries and recognition judiciaries is not unproblematic. In fact, the
labeling may be misleading in some ways. In Britain, judges traditionally tended to be selected from
among those who have served as barristers and later as Queen’s Counsel (or King’s Counsel). All current
justices of the U.K. Supreme Court were recruited from the English and Scottish appellate courts (High
Court of Justice, Court of Appeal and Court of Session). Some scholars have seen this as a form of
career.9 In Israel, most appointments to the Supreme Court are individuals who have served previously
as clerks. Although India’s constitution provides that the composition of the Supreme Court can include
lawyers of high recognition, it is overwhelmingly dominated by the senior judges from the states’ high
courts.10 In the U.S., all but one of the current Supreme Court justices have served previously in
appellate courts, confirming a trend established long ago.11 These recognition judiciaries have some
careerist elements. However, we should distinguish these forms of “career” from in three substantial
ways. First, career judiciaries are fundamentally dominated by a bureaucratic approach to the career, in
which apolitical seniority considerations are central, while recognition judiciaries have an informal or
7

See Georgakopoulos, supra 1.
However, such experience could enhance the likelihood of obtaining nomination for a higher court.
9
See Posner, supra 3. See also Tom Bingham, The Judicial House of Lords, 1876‐2009 (2009) detailing that only
eleven Law Lords had no previous judicial experience. The appointment of Justice Sumption (QC but without
previous judicial experience) in May 2011 was extremely controversial.
10
See Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court of India, International Journal of Constitutional Law 1: 476‐510 (2003)
and Venkat Iyer, The Supreme Court of India, in Judicial Activism in Common Law Supreme Courts, ed. Brice
Dickson (Oxford U Press , 2007). Based on the Federal Court of India under the British, the Supreme Court of India
was constituted in 1950. It had seven justices, six (including the Chief Justice) had served in the British court. The
composition of the Supreme Court of India has been expanded five times by constitutional amendments. The
current composition is twenty‐six justices. The selection of justices has been a matter of political tension. As to the
appointment of the Chief Justice, there was supposed to be a norm that the senior justice becomes Chief Justice, a
norm imposed by the Court itself in 1951. Indira Gandhi violated the rule twice (1973 and 1976) to impose her
candidate against senior justices (there were resignations at the Court as consequence). The seniority principle was
reaffirmed in 1978 and since then has been followed. As to the selection of associate justices, the India
Constitution is ambiguous in the effort to avoid both the British and the American models. Appointments should
be achieved by consultations between the executive and the Chief Justice. Inevitably problems emerge when there
is disagreement. The practice is for the executive to dominate. Three famous judicial cases have shaped the
process (1982, 1994 and 1999) and minimize political influence by creating a powerful collegium of the five most
senior justices (at the expense of the Chief Justice). This collegium has reinforced the trend to pick senior judges
from the states’ high courts. The system of collegium has currently been challenged before the Supreme Court of
India (http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Print/681311.aspx, last checked: June 3, 2011).
11
See Daniel Klerman, Nonpromotion and judicial independence, Southern California Law Review 72, 455 – 464
(1998).
8
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unstructured “career” mingled with a selection mechanism that is more politicized in nature. Second,
judges in career judiciaries have a judicial position as the formal first step in the career, while judges in
recognition systems start in a non‐judicial position. Finally, as noted before, transfers to courts of equal
seniority are generally part of the career path in career judiciaries but not in recognition judiciaries.

At the same time, we should not neglect the rich diversity of arrangements within each category. If we
look at the Supreme Courts of U.S. states, it is easy to observe different selection mechanisms, all within
the broad category of recognition judiciaries. However, as easily observed from Table one, the size of
these courts is fairly stable across states and across selection mechanisms (in unreported analysis, we
also calculated the average age of the current justices and we could not find significant variation within
U.S. states).
<Insert Table 1 here>
The remarkably consistent size of these courts across the U.S. contrasts dramatically with the Supreme
Courts of Brazilian states, where the numbers presented in Table 2 show considerable variance. Unlike
the Supreme Courts of U.S. states, all Brazilian courts in Table 2 have the same selection mechanism
(four‐fifths are career judges while one‐fifth are appointed through recognition mechanisms). Even
though the Brazilian Constitution demands that these courts address constitutional review en banc, the
larger courts have organized a (smaller and manageable) specialized section to address such questions,
due to the large number of judges on the entire court. In short, there are considerable variations in
relevant institutional variables within any given system.
<Insert Table 2 here>
Each judicial model raises different challenges in terms of incentives and performance. Furthermore, the
precise design of the mechanisms for judicial appointment – assessment, selection and removal –
provides for a specific relationship with the relevant external and internal audiences.12 By internal
audiences, we mean those that operate within the judiciary itself, typically more senior judges charged
with supervising inferior judges. By external audiences, we focus on other branches of government,
lawyers, law professors, litigants, and the public more generally. These incentives tend to be reinforced
by other aspects of the judicial system, including the possibility of issuing separate opinions and
12

See Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Audiences and Reputation: Perspectives from Comparative Law,
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 47: 451‐491 (2009) and Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Reputation,
Information, and the Organization of the Judiciary, Journal of Comparative Law 4: 226‐254 (2010).
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dissents, sentencing and procedural discretion, the scope of appeals (for example, de novo review), the
use of citations, the court’s powers to select cases and control the docket, the management and budget
of the court system, and the size of the courts. Not surprisingly, the career and recognition judiciaries
emerge in very different institutional settings.13

The distinction between career and recognition judiciaries is useful to identify general approaches to the
balance between independence and accountability. It is also important to analyze particular incentives
and institutional attributes.14 In particular, identifying the relevant institutional design can help inform
models to evaluate and discuss legal reform. However, in order to understand the proper functioning of
any particular judiciary, we cannot rely exclusively on this particular classification because it is too
general and probably too divorced from other important institutional details.

We believe that the key distinction between career and recognition judiciaries corresponds generally
with our own approach to the study of the judiciary. Our framework is based on a team production
model of judicial organization.15 Career systems emphasize collective reputation (in which internal
audiences prevail over external audiences); recognition systems emphasize individual reputation (thus
targeting more openly external audiences). Collective reputation emphasizes collegial aspects of the
judicial profession. Individual reputation focuses on the particular salience of a given judge. The choice
between collective and individual reputation depends in part on the primary social function of the
judiciary, such as social control, dispute resolution or lawmaking.16 We believe that collective reputation
dominates when the legal system emphasizes social control: hierarchical systems reduce agency costs by
allowing superior levels to supervise lower levels. On the other hand, when judges are delegated with
the task of lawmaking, ex ante screening is a better device to ensure optimal law. In our view, these
observations help in explaining why we observe a dominant structure within any particular legal
systems.

13

Id.
See different approaches by Richard A. Posner, What do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing as
Everybody Else), Supreme Court Economic Review 3: 1 (1993); Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and
Performance: An Economic Approach, Florida State University Law Review 32: 1259 (2005); Richard A. Posner, How
Judges Think, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (2008).
15
See Garoupa and Ginsburg, supra 12.
16
This distinction comes from Martin Shapiro, Courts (1981). See also Mirjan Damaska, The Faces of Justice and
State Authority (1986).
14
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At the same time, by distinguishing different functions of the judiciary, our own model helps to elucidate
the particular balance between the career and recognition models exhibited in any given system. The
judicial role in social control and lawmaking are present in all legal systems, albeit with different degrees
of intensity. Not surprisingly, pockets of career (recognition) judiciary develop in legal systems
dominated by recognition (career) judiciaries in areas that are better served by a different institutional
arrangement. For example, in constitutional law, where lawmaking is presumably the dominant function
of judges engaging with the grand principles of democratic governance in high‐stakes issues, most
common and civil law jurisdiction use recognition judiciaries. On the other hand, in many areas of
administrative law, where social control of lower officials is the more relevant consideration, both
common and civil law jurisdictions have shown a strong preference for career judiciaries. Administrative
law involves the control and monitoring of technical decisions by experts, frequently involving relatively
low stakes; constitutional law involves establishing the general principles regulating the role of
government, and hence usually has higher stakes.

Our theory explains the relevant differences between career and recognition judiciaries from a novel
perspective. It also helps to understand why legal systems favor a mix of the two, rather than a pure
institutional design. From this starting point, we argue that all systems are institutionally hybrid, and
there are good reasons to be so.

Legal scholars tend to argue about the merits of career and recognition judiciaries as pure types. For
example, career judiciaries resemble a bureaucracy, and so raise issues of shirking and sabotage of the
agency’s mission that are familiar to organizational theorists.17 Not surprisingly, we observe a formal
reliance on codes and significant procedural limitations to constrain the judges, limit their ability to
sabotage the law, and decrease the costs of monitoring their performance.18 As a result, a career
judiciary is methodologically conservative and systematically unadventurous, and unwilling to
acknowledge its role in lawmaking.19 Strict rules predominate, especially at the level of ideology.
Recognition judiciaries are different. They are dominated by lateral entry; and promotion is of little
significance to the individual judge. Since ex ante quality is easier to observe, judges are less constrained

17

See Posner (2005), supra 14.
Id. See also Benito Arruñada and Veneta Andonova, Common Law and Civil Law as Pro‐Market Adaptations,
Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 26 (2008) and Benito Arruñada and Veneta Andonova, Judges’
Cognition and Market Order, Review of Law and Economics 4: 665 (2008).
19
See Posner (2005), supra 14.
18
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and tend to apply more flexible standards as opposed to clear rules.20 There are two possible behavioral
consequences for the recognition model. First, the judiciary is more politicized (but not necessarily more
democratic since it might not follow the legislator). Second, recognition judiciaries will be more creative
in establishing and developing precedents (presumably inducing higher rates of reversal).21

Our point is that precisely because each type of judiciary has different institutional implications, legal
systems tend to use both. We do not observe career and recognition judiciaries in their pure form, but
instead see the types interact in a given legal system within a particular contextual and historical
experience. In short, we observe hybrid arrangements. Obviously the particular mix of career and
recognition varies across countries. We recognize that, notwithstanding hybrids, one type of judiciary
tends to dominate in any given legal system. This might in fact be an artifact of historical factors:
particular institutional patterns may become established through contingent factors and remain
relatively stable thereafter.22 However, by neglecting the presence and persistence of hybrid systems,
the existing literature has failed to understand the coexistence of both ideal types and its implications.
We offer an institutional account of the emergence of hybrids using the principal‐agent model, while
recognizing that the dominant structure in each system might still be explained as a result of historical
contingency and limited convergence.23 Another way to express our idea is that legal systems develop a
default institutional arrangement due to historical and contextual factors. However, the default
arrangement can be modified, depending on institutional needs and responding to significant contextual
changes, thus promoting the existence of pockets. For example, as we will elaborate in some detail later
on, higher courts in civil law jurisdictions were traditionally made up of exclusively career judges
following the classic French model. However, these courts have evolved to partially accommodate a
recognition structure (usually a particular fixed quota of the new appointments to the court).

20

Id.
Id. Although it is difficult to compare rates of reversal across systems when the legal importance of precedent
varies.
22
Legal economists have suggested possible rational explanations for the development of career judiciary. See
Arruñada and Andonova, supra 18. More generally, see Edward Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 117: 1193 (2002).
23
See Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, International and Comparative Law Quarterly
45: 52 (1996), Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, Modern Law Review 60: 44 (1997), Pierre Legrand,
Fragments on Law‐as‐Culture (1999), Nuno Garoupa and Anthony Ogus, A Strategic Theory of Legal Transplants, J.
Legal Studies 35: 339 (2006).
21
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We should distinguish our account of hybrid systems from the standard comparative law literature.
Comparativists describe Louisiana, Scotland or South Africa as hybrid or mixed legal systems, focusing on
the coexistence of code law and case law (or more mundanely, the application of both common and civil
law in those particular jurisdictions).24 We are less concerned with the formal sources of law than the
institutional structures of judicial organization. Therefore, we argue that most, if not all, legal systems
are institutional hybrids. In a sense, our understanding of hybrid legal systems is narrower since we are
only looking at institutional structures, and not substantive or procedural law. However, as a
consequence of our approach, the pool of hybrid legal systems is much broader than the one usually
considered by comparativists, since it is difficult to find a pure type legal institutional arrangement that
pervades an entire system.

The simple observation that legal systems frequently combine career and recognition judiciaries
(although in different ways and degrees) indicates that pure solutions are unlikely to be optimal in
institutional terms. Our theory explains positively and normatively why hybrids are the norm and seem
to be more functional than pure types. In mathematical language, if jurisdictions maximize the net
benefit from their institutional arrangements, a combination of career and recognition judiciaries is
generally optimal whereas corner solutions are suboptimal.

The paper is structured as follows. First, we motivate the discussion by providing several prominent
examples of the coexistence of career and recognition judiciaries. In section III, we provide our theory of
pockets. In section IV, we discuss the implications of the analysis, and provide a preliminary empirical
analysis in section V. Section VI concludes the paper.

II.

EXAMPLES OF POCKETS

In this section, we consider several prominent examples of pockets: recognition judiciaries in the
traditionally “careerist” civil law, and career judiciaries in common law jurisdictions usually considered
to be “recognition” systems.

24

Vernon Palmer, Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide: The Third Legal Family (2007).
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(A) Recognition systems in civil law
(A1) Constitutional judges
The design of most constitutional courts in the Western world has been influenced by the original ideas
and legal theories of Hans Kelsen.25 Kelsen emphasized a normative hierarchy of law. Under his legal
theory, ordinary (career) judges are mandated to apply law as legislated or decided by the parliament
(the legislative branch of government). Consequently there is subordination of the ordinary (career)
judges to the legislator, and judicial review of legislation would be incompatible with the work of an
ordinary court. Hence, only an extrajudicial organ can effectively restrain the legislature and act as the
guarantor of the will of the constitutional legislator. The Kelsenian model proposes a centralized body
outside of the structure of the conventional judiciary to exercise constitutional review, namely a
constitutional court.26

From its origins in interwar Austria, this model has spread around the world and is now a conventional
choice for constitutional designers. The application of the Kelsenian model in each country has
conformed to local conditions, so there are a variety of institutional designs with different judicial
competences, access, composition, and appointment mechanisms. Kelsenian‐type courts for
constitutional review exist now in most European countries of the civil law tradition, with the
Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries being the most striking exceptions. Also most former
communist Central and Eastern countries have now developed a similar institutional structure. Korea,
Thailand, Taiwan, Colombia and Chile, among others, also follow this model.

The centralization of constitutional review in a body outside of the conventional career judiciary has
been attractive during periods of democratization after a period of an authoritarian government in
many countries in Europe, Asia and Latin America. The career judiciary is usually suspected of allegiance
to the former regime, and hence, a new court is expected to be more responsive to the democratic
ideals contemplated in the new constitution.27

25

For a general discussion, see A. Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe, Oxford
University Press (2000). Also see Hans Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Austrian
and the American Constitution, Journal of Politics 4, 183 (1942).
26
Const. Austria, Arts. 137‐48 (1920).
27
On the prestige of constitutional courts, see Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Building Reputation between
Constitutional Courts: Party and Judicial Politics, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law (2012).
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The particular composition of constitutional courts differs across the world, but the appointment
mechanisms tend to be political in nature. Unlike the traditional career judiciary, which is politically
insulated and generally subject to some form of judicial council, constitutional judges are selected in a
manner closer to the recognition model. They are usually chosen by a combination of the other
branches of government (executive and legislative) and, in some cases, third parties (law societies, the
judicial council, even the military in the Turkish case); Table three provides some examples in Europe. In
practice, in most countries, a large fraction of constitutional judges is originally from the career judiciary;
in some countries there is even a mandatory minimum quota for career judges in the constitutional
court. However, the politicization of the appointment mechanism is inevitable, thus making it
significantly different from the standard career judiciary.
<Insert Table 3 here>
In some instances, there is a de facto quota system. Each political party has a number of slots on the
court, and new appointments are the product of party negotiations with little resemblance to judicial
appointments in other courts.28 The main consequence is the alignment of the preferences of the
constitutional judges with those of the political parties, not surprising given that political interests tend
to prevail in the selection of candidates.29 In turn, the perception of a politicized constitutional court
(mostly because of the selection and appointment mechanisms) generates conflicts with the career
judiciary that populates the ordinary courts, which we have described elsewhere.30 Significant
fluctuations in the political composition of the constitutional court tend to exacerbate these conflicts.31

(A2) Commercial courts in France
The French commercial courts (Tribunaux de commerce) are not populated by career judges.32 It is a
system of courts that can be traced back to 1563 and survived the important reforms of the
professionalization of the French court system. The enforcement of the 1807 Code du commerce is
entrusted to these courts staffed only by businessmen that deal with litigation concerning commercial
28

This also applies to renewal of judicial terms. Generally speaking constitutional judges have a fixed term in office,
although Belgium and Austria, for example, have life tenure subject to mandatory retirement.
29
See Nuno Garoupa, Empirical Legal Studies and Constitutional Courts, Indian Journal of Constitutional Law 4
(2010).
30
See Garoupa and Ginsburg, supra 27; Lech Garlicki, Constitutional Courts versus Supreme Courts, Int’l J. Const. L.
5: 44 (2007).
31
Id.
32
See generally Amalia D. Kessler, Marginalization and Myth: The Corporatist Roots of France’s Forgotten Elective
Judiciary, American Journal of Comparative Law 58: 679 (2009).
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matters (including company law, bankruptcy, business contracts including unfair competition and patent
litigation). These lay judges are elected for terms of four years by the members of the local chamber of
commerce after practicing as businessmen for at least five years.33 In the court, they sit in panels of at
least three.34 Commercial litigation is dominated by oral proceedings unlike the general arrangements in
the civil law tradition. They are considered to be reasonably fast as compared to the regular courts.
There are few appeals to the Cour d’appeal and even fewer reversals.35

(A3) Recognition judiciaries in Higher Courts
Many civil law countries reserve some places at the higher courts for non‐career judges, usually
introduced as lawyers, prosecutors or law professors recognized by the appropriate committee as of
high merit. For example, in Spain, under some conditions established by law, lawyers and law professors
can become judges at the higher courts without previous experience serving as lower court judges (they
are called the cuarto turno in reference to the fact that it used to be the case that the three previous
hiring seasons had to be completed with career judges). The process of appointment is administrative in
nature (involving an examination plus assessment of merits), but they are conceptually closer to
recognition judiciaries. A similar example is found in Brazil, where the President can appoint up to one‐
fifth of the federal appellate judiciary from among lawyers and prosecutors. Such judges are called the
quinto constitucional by virtue of the fact that they constitute one‐fifth of the judiciary in the higher
courts. The remaining seats are taken by career judges. The quinto constitucional candidates are
suggested by the law society and the federal prosecution body respectively. The President picks up one
name out of the three suggested.36

Another example can be found in Japan. While the lower courts are populated with career judges, the
Supreme Court is different. The justices are appointed by the Prime Minister and include a mix of career
judges from lower courts, law professors, prosecutors, bureaucrats and lawyers. The appointment
mechanism is potentially politicized and many believe that the Supreme Court appointees tend to be

33

Only the court recorder (greffier) has legal training. See John Bell, Sophie Boyron and Simon Whittaker, Principles
of French Law (2000).
34
Simple cases are heard by the president and around 30% by the three judge panel, see Bell et al., supra 33.
35
Id.
36
For discussion, see Maria Angela Oliveira and Nuno Garoupa, Choosing Judges in Brazil: Reassessing Legal
Transplants from the U.S, American Journal of Comparative Law 59: 529‐561 (2011).
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aligned with the preferences of the ruling party.37 In France, the Conseil d’État is the supreme
administrative court. There is a separate career for the judiciary in the regular courts and in the Conseil
d’État. However, the appointment to the highest rank in the Conseil d’État is open to highly prestigious
bureaucrats and lawyers (called the tour éxterieur; they are suppose to constitute a third of the new
conselleirs d’État appointed every year).38 In the Netherlands, entrance to the judiciary is open to
lawyers, law professors and civil servants with a law degree. They are evaluated by a committee on the
merits that usually proposes a training period before making a final recommendation to appointment.
The outsiders account for 70% or more of all judges now.39

(A4) Other specialized courts
Many civil law countries have specialized courts for electoral matters, military courts or courts for
certain specific business matters (such as antitrust law, intellectual property, or bankruptcy). Usually
these courts are not composed of career judges, but of individuals who are subject to a special selection
and appointment process. Specialization in the particular relevant area of the law is generally the main
criteria for these judiciaries. The special selection and appointment process is frequently more
administrative and less political in nature, but nevertheless different from the standard career judiciary,
and the judges usually have an ambiguous relationship with the ordinary judiciary. While these
specialized judges are part of the judiciary, they are not always perceived as such by the ordinary
(career) judiciary.

(B) Career systems in the common law
Despite the general view that the United States and United Kingdom have recognition judiciaries, this
imagery is drawn from higher judiciaries in both countries: the federal judiciary in the United States and
the group nominally identified as “judges” in the United Kingdom. But the fact is that most judges in the
both systems operate in structures that look more like career judiciaries than recognition ones. This is

37

See Ramseyer and Nakazato, supra 6. But see John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity,
Autonomy, and the Public Trust, in Law in Japan: A Turning Point 99, 114 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007). See also John
O. Haley, Litigation in Japan: A New Look at Old Problems, Willamette J. Int’l L. D. R. 10: 121, 139 (2002) (“By nearly
all accounts, Japan’s judges are collectively the most politically autonomous and individually the most honest in
the world, as well as among the most trusted.”). Also, John O. Haley, The Spirit of Japanese Law (1998) and David
Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan, Texas Law Rev. (2010).
38
A similar mechanism applies to the intermediate rank, maîtres de requêtes; one quarter of the selected
candidates should be from the tour éxterieur.
39
See the words of Mr. Nichoras Schipper (President of the Committee for Selection of Judges in 2003),
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/activities/meetings/20030202_2.html, (last checked: June 3, 2011).
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especially apparent in administrative law, in which judges are utilized as monitors of government
agencies.

(B1) Administrative law judges in the U.S.
Administrative law judges (ALJs) in the United States appear to be a hybrid institution. They are
established by the Administrative Procedures Act to act and are considered to be “Article I judges”
meaning that they are part of the Executive rather than the judicial branch (which is set up by Article III
of the U.S. Constitution).40 They sit within particular agencies, and in many cases their decisions are
considered to be subject to being overturned by the head of the agency. These decisions can be
appealed to the federal courts under the APA, and the ALJ decision is part of the record to be taken into
account when reviewing agency action.41

Nevertheless, they are guaranteed independence and

insulated from the line staff of agencies.42 ALJs are appointed on the basis of a comprehensive written
and oral test,43 and so entry to the profession looks much more like the merit‐based “career” approach
than the political process used for the federal judiciary. They can be fired only for good cause, based on
a decision by a Merit Systems Protections Board that sits outside the agency.

America states also have systems of administrative law judges, though there is a good deal of variation
in the structure of the system. Several states have central panel systems for administrative law judges,
so that all agencies share a pool of ALJs.44 In other states, administrative law judges sit within the
agency, paralleling the federal system. In either case, they serve in a hierarchical bureaucratic career
model characterized by merit selection and long careers.

There are thousands of administrative law judges in the United States, in both the state and federal
systems. They form the primary decision‐makers for hundreds of thousands of decisions, and hence
ought to be considered part of the overall judicial apparatus in the country. Clearly this pocket is a
40

5 U.S.C. § 556
Universal Camera v. NLRB (194X)
42
R. Terrence Harders, Striking a Balance: Administrative Law Judge Independence and Accountability, Journal of
the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 19 (1999). An exception is immigration law judges, who are
“attorneys whom the Attorney General appoints as administrative judges” and are appointed to act “as the
Attorney General's delegates in the cases that come before them.”
43
See Jesse Etelson, The New ALJ Examination: A Bright, Shining Lie Redux, Administrative Law Review 43: 185
(1991) (critiquing the exam structure).
44
Malcolm C Rich, The Central Panel System for Administrative Law Judges: a Survey of Seven States (Chicago,
American Judicature Society); Earl Thomas, Administrative Law Judges: The Corps Issue (Washington, D.C., National
Conference of Administrative Law Judges, Judicial Administration Division, American Bar Association, 1987).
41

13

significant and important one, in terms of the number of cases they decide and the impact they have on
ordinary people’s lives.

(B2) Tribunals in the U.K.
While it is true that the senior judiciary in the U.K. is appointed nearly exclusively from the ranks of
practicing barristers, there are other systems within the British judiciary that look more like career
systems. The British system of tribunals is established to hear cases against the administration.45 There
has historically been great diversity within the tribunal system and many cases, especially involving
specialized areas are decided by panels in which only the chairman is legally qualified. But recent years
have seen efforts to standardize the tribunals system, ensuring that the judges who sit in it are qualified
and are independent. They are now subject to appointment from the Judicial Appointments
Commission, and some five hundred of them sit full time.

(B3) Military judiciaries
Military judiciaries are another career system within the common law tradition. In the United States
armed forces, Judge Advocates General (JAGs) join the military soon out of law school and will typically
spend their whole career within the military service. They undergo special training soon after joining to
qualify for the judge. In some branches, they form a separate corps, while in others they are line
officers who can be pulled into active duty. JAGs serve as military prosecutors and defense counsel in
trials, as well as providing legal advice to the command. Some JAGs will serve as military judges in
courts‐martial cases. Cases can be appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals staffed by appellate
military judges. The apex of the system is a Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, which is similar to
the federal judiciary in that its appointees are nominated by the President and approved by the Senate.
The basic military judge is appointed by the Judge Advocate General in each service. The judges form a
standing judiciary that is independent of the parties to the case, and military judges cannot be removed
or unseated improperly.46

The British military justice system is partially civilianized in that the Judge Advocate General corps,
whose “judge‐advocates” preside over courts‐martial, and the Courts‐Martial Appeal Court, are both

45

Not all British tribunals are established to hear cases against the administration. For example, Employment
Tribunals hear cases brought by employees against employers, including for alleged discrimination.
46
United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405(2006).
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civilian arms of the government independent from the military.47 Nevertheless, the tradition of British
military justice has differences from the U.S. model.48

(C) Supra‐national judicial review
International bodies tend, by their nature, to be “recognition” structures in which judges are appointed
by nation states from among senior lawyers, diplomats and academics.49 They serve limited terms
(although in some courts such as the European Court of Justice may be subject to reappointment) and
are not promoted (though lateral movement across international regimes is possible). In this sense,
they resemble the US Federal judiciary rather than the prototypical French judge, even though many of
them are drawn from civilian systems.

Some of these bodies, including the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter‐American Court of
Human Rights, and the European Court of Justice, play an effective supervisory role over national
judiciaries, so that cases can be appealed from the national to the supranational level. In Europe, at
least, this means that they constitute a kind of pocket within the dominant career model; though to the
extent that they supervise courts in the UK and Ireland, they reinforce the recognition structure that is
already dominant.

These supranational courts, by their nature, are heavily involved in quasi‐

constitutional review and serve a lawmaking function.

The relationship between these “recognition” supra‐national courts and the national career judiciary in
Europe has not always been straightforward. The nature of EU law is derived from the expansionary
character of the European Court of Justice, whose active judicial lawmaking has resulted in profound
transformations in the governance of the Union.50 It is unlikely that the role of the European Court of
Justice would be the same if it had been designed as a conventional career judiciary.51 At the same time,
national courts have reacted to the ECJ in different ways. Initially, national courts were cautious about
the interventions of these “recognition” supra‐national courts. However, as the European courts
established a good reputation and high prestige for lawmaking in relevant areas, national courts have
acknowledged the importance of general principles of law over codification and shifted from mere social
47
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control to more active lawmaking. Such change has raised concerns about the role of a career judiciary
in dealing with legal activism.52

III.

THEORY OF JUDICIAL POCKETS

We have demonstrated that the traditional distinction between the common law operating a
recognition judiciary and civilian systems operating a careerist one is not fully accurate. What might
explain the hybrids we observe? The traditional account of the choice between career and recognition
judiciaries relies on legal culture and tradition. The common law system developed a prestigious
judiciary because of its evolution from among the King’s officers over many centuries. In turn, the U.S.
federal institutional design was a strategic response to the perceived shortcomings of the British model.
The civil law system fostered career judiciaries as a mechanism to comply with the predominant
ideology of state positivism and to ensure legal certainty, particularly in an atmosphere of distrust of
judges in the early 19th century. Prior to that time, France had a form of recognition judiciary, but after
the codification of the civil law, judges were viewed as being subservient to the will of the legislator.
The choice of career or recognition judiciaries was therefore historically determined by different local
concerns and ideologies, and, according to many, these initial choices persisted so as to have long‐run
effects on legal institutions.

However, these historical and cultural explanations leave little space for understanding the current
trends within both types of judiciary, unless pure path dependence persists. They also fail to grasp the
hybridization of legal systems in terms of institutional settings that seems to be a feature of many real‐
world systems.

Another set of accounts focuses on the development of institutional structures as a solution to
commitment problems on the part of rulers. According to this literature, the historical development of
constitutional structures, including an independent judiciary, arose out of a need for monarchs to tie
their hands and make promises credible.53 This literature has focused on contingent factors that led to
divergent historical experiences, as well as the consequences of institutional choices. We view the
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See the discussion by Mitchell Lasser, Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Transparency and
Legitimacy (2004) and Mitchell Lasser, Judicial Transformations: The Rights Revolution in the Courts of Europe
(2009).
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Douglass C. North and Barry Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing
Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England, J. Econ Hist. 49: 803 (1989).
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precommitment framework as complementary to the agency framework that we develop below, but do
not take a stance on which particular form of judicial organization that we consider is superior in terms
of commitment.

We provide an alternative account of alternative institutional structures. Our departing point is the
principal‐agent model of the judiciary, which has been applied with some success in particular national
contexts in recent years.54 In the model, each society has a sovereign, modeled as a unitary actor, that is,
the principal. The principal might be the people in a democracy; the government; or an individual in a
monarchy. The principal hires judges as agents to accomplish a certain set of tasks. We assume that
these tasks include, in every legal system, some amount of judicial lawmaking, as well as a degree of
routine social control and dispute resolution functions.55 The precise balance between these three
functions is fixed for our purposes. The task for the principal can be seen as hiring, within a budget
constraint, a set of agents involving a mix of high skills (making new law) and lower level skills (applying
pre‐existing rules to factual situations). The high‐skill agents have more human capital and hence are
more expensive, though they may also find it easier to shirk (since they are better at deceiving the
principal since they have an informational advantage). Low‐skill agents may be more malleable. Due to
these differences in quality of potential agents, there are tradeoffs between hiring large numbers of
low‐skill agents and a smaller number of high‐skill agents.

Judges are like any other agent in that there are agency costs involved in hiring them. Judges may wish
to pursue their own vision of justice, or may exert insufficient effort. Loosely speaking, there are two
fundamental sources of agency costs in this context. One is that the preferences of the judiciary may be
isolated from those of society. In other words, the judiciary attracts the wrong kind of individuals from
the perspective of the principal. This is a standard adverse selection issue. The other potential problem
is that the judiciary is not sufficiently incentivized to perform well and therefore prefers to expropriate
from the principal some of the benefits of its performance. Shirking is the classical example, but this
category could also include judicial development of doctrines that benefit the judiciary directly rather
54
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than society, such as procedural rules that empower judges or force the society to allocate more
resources to the judiciary. The most extreme example of judicial expropriation is corruption. These kinds
of moves can be seen as raising a moral hazard problem.

Adverse selection and moral hazard generate significant agency costs in every legal system. However,
the balance between them varies, and this may lead to different institutional solutions. The institutional
designer has a variety of mechanisms to control agency costs. These are familiar. One can “screen” by
requiring that agents engage in costly signaling before hiring, through investment in activities that
indicate fitness for the job;56 one can shape the composition of the bench in terms of which agents serve
on it; one can encourage or constrain agents to be loyal to the principal by virtue of institutional devices
such as requiring the following of legal precedent, and controlling of dockets and jurisdiction; one can
hire superior agents to supervise the lower level agents in a hierarchical structure; and one can set up
external monitors to watch what judges are doing. The first three solutions deal with the adverse
selection problem, while the latter two focus on the moral hazard problem.

(1) Adverse selection
Addressing adverse selection frequently requires more screening on the principal’s side and more
signaling on the agent’s side. The creation and disclosure of information concerning the preferences of
potential judges is necessary to minimize the misalignment between the goals of the principal and the
goals of the agent. The recognition judiciary seems to be a better option to address these issues.
Reputation and prestige with external audiences provide more disclosure of information, and previous
experience in a legal profession can be used as a proxy to identify judicial preferences. The more intense
politicization of judicial appointments associated with the recognition judiciary merely reflects the
importance of scrutinizing preferences and avoiding a bench that does not mirror society. By addressing
more strongly the adverse selection problem, a system with a recognition judiciary can more easily rely
on the judges to engage in the high‐skill activity of lawmaking since they tend to reproduce more
accurately the options favored by society. On the other hand, the costliness of the screening process
raises the costs of hiring, and so we would expect fewer judges to be hired.
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It is also possible that, once hired, judges will be more susceptible to moral hazard. This might be
particularly true if one thinks of the principal as a political party that initially supports the judiciary but
loses out of power. However, iIf the principal is society, alternation in power may enhance the
alignment of preferences between principal and agent.57 Political and procedural checks and balances
have to be used to avoid excessive agency costs due to moral hazard. Developments in many common
law jurisdictions seem to be largely responding to these issues (for example, attempts to curb excessive
judicialization of public policy, the growing importance of statute law, and the use of sentencing and
procedural guidelines to minimize judicial discretion).

There are institutional factors that are relevant to understand the impact of adverse selection. Binding
precedents, docket control, and judicially‐created doctrines on justiciability (including the political
questions doctrine), are associated with recognition judiciaries but hardly observable in legal
environments with career judiciaries. If the screening mechanism is effective and the misalignment of
preferences between agent and principal is minimized, the legal system can develop institutional
practices that make lawmaking by courts more effective. Not surprisingly, courts with recognition
judiciaries tend to issue binding or absolute precedents, exert some form of docket control (not
necessarily as generous as the writ of certiorari), and address justiciability questions and conflicts of
jurisdiction. If the screening mechanism does not provide for a judiciary with aligned preferences, we
tend to observe institutional features that heavily constrain judicial lawmaking. Opinions are
explanatory or clarifying of legal rules but not precedential, there is little to no docket control, and
justiciability questions and jurisdictional conflicts cannot be addressed by the court. This description
applies to courts dominated by career judiciaries. In fact, in civil law countries, precedent erga omnes,
docket control (by some form of procedural rules of access), and jurisdiction over justiciability questions
and jurisdictional conflicts are common features of the constitutional court (recognition judiciary) and
not of the supreme court (career judiciary), consistent with our theory.

(2) Moral Hazard
Directly tackling moral hazard usually requires control of agents through monitoring and ongoing
evaluation based on output. In the context of separation of powers, the principal cannot do this directly,
and so a career judiciary might emerge as the appropriate mechanism to reduce moral hazard.
57

J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, Journal of Legal Studies 23:
271 (1994).
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Hierarchical control, systematic monitoring by a specialized agency composed of judges, periodic
rotation to avoid too much local control of expertise and knowledge are consistent with the idea of
reducing moral hazard. The shortcoming with this solution is that the principal has little direct control
over judicial selection, thus enhancing a potential adverse selection problem. Codification and strict
limitations on case law are useful to effectively constrain the judiciary and force conformity with the
preferences of the principal.58 Codes that enhance clarity and minimize interstitial lawmaking emerge as
a cost‐effective technology for reducing preference asymmetry.59 While codification is the common law
world is regarded as a mere instrument of organizing legislation in a more systematic and coherent way
than dispersed statute law, even this may be effective in restraining the judiciary because it imposes
internal consistency and reduces significantly the need for judicial interpretation and creativity.
Specialized training encourages the so‐called esprit de corps (we could translate as strong professional
norms) that induce adherence to legalism and its emphasis on the illegitimacy of judicial lawmaking,
thus minimizing agency slack.60

We have explained how the choice between career and recognition judiciaries can be understood in the
context of identifying and reducing agency costs in the form of adverse selection and moral hazard. The
career model emphasizes hierarchical supervision to deal with moral hazard and internalized
professional norms (esprit de corps) to deal with adverse selection. The recognition model emphasizes
ex ante screening to deal with adverse selection and external monitoring (through transparent opinions,
and the existence of monitors of the courts) to deal with moral hazard.

Corruption can be seen as evidence of a severe moral hazard problem. According to our model, if a
particular jurisdiction has a significant concern about judicial corruption, it should favor a career
judiciary because the mechanisms of monitoring are more appropriate. Some countries, such as India,
seem to have shifted away from a traditional recognition judiciary into a more career judiciary because
appointments by elected politicians are seen as inducing or supporting corruption in the bench.
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Although this would raise natural questions about democratic legitimacy and the role of the principal, in
the context of our model, the argument would be that the traditional institutional design fostered,
rather than reduced, adverse selection (from the viewpoint of the corrupt preferences of the
politicians).

It is likely that the balance of these agency costs change over time with political, economic and cultural
factors. However, it is also the case that within any given legal system, it is likely that some areas of law
raise more adverse selection concerns and other areas of the law raise more moral hazard concerns. In
particular, the high skill areas of law, where judicial lawmaking is needed, rely on selecting agents to
exercise discretion responsibly, and hence the adverse selection mechanisms are predominant. Lower‐
skilled areas, in which judges are simply applying pre‐existing rules, require less expertise, but raise
moral hazard problems of shirking.

For example, consider constitutional law or electoral law. It is likely that the principal is more concerned
about the preferences of the judiciary being aligned rather than shirking or expropriation. Lawmaking in
these two areas is of capital political importance. Therefore, recognition judiciaries should tend to
prevail in constitutional adjudication or electoral disputes. At the same time, higher courts are more
likely to address socially and economically relevant principles of law than lower courts which deal more
systematically with facts. Adverse selection concerns are likely to predominate in higher courts whereas
moral hazard is the greater concern in lower courts. This could explain why civil law jurisdictions develop
some pockets of recognition judiciaries in higher courts.

The opposite is true in areas such as administrative law or military law, in which the job of the judiciary
is essentially to serve as a monitor of lower level government agents.61 These tasks are more routine,
and hence less likely to involve high‐skill recognition judiciaries. In this context, social control is a major
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goal, and not easily be subverted by the judiciary. Not surprisingly, career judiciaries tend to
predominate in these areas of the law.62

Our quantitative exploration in a later section seems to largely confirm these observations. We find a
strong correlation between the use of recognition judiciaries and constitutional adjudication. At the
same time, we find little to no correlation between the use of recognition judiciaries and administrative
adjudication. Further confirming this evidence, there is negative correlation between constitutional
adjudication and administrative adjudication (a court invested with powers to exert constitutional
review is not likely to be invested with identical powers to exercise administrative review).

Of course, many areas of the law, if not all, combine lawmaking and social control. We have provided
two extreme examples, constitutional law and administrative adjudication. What about areas of private
law such as contracts, torts or property or criminal law? Since they involve both judicial roles, the
principal has to supplement the selection mechanism with an institutional design that minimizes agency
costs. Recognition judiciaries address adverse selection problems; hence we should expect moral hazard
to be the dominant concern when it comes to private law and criminal law. Not surprisingly, we can
observe the expansion of statutory law and judicial guidelines as a method to effectively monitor the
judiciary. Career judiciaries address moral hazard problems; therefore adverse selection could be a
significant concern in private law and criminal law. As described before, we have observed an expansion
in the use of lawyers, prosecutors or law professors recognized by the appropriate committee as of high
merit in traditional career judiciaries (mainly in the higher courts) and the development of specialized
courts.

Institutional logic seems a better general explanation than mere cultural and historical path
dependency, which are highly localized accounts that are not always falsifiable. First, the balance of
agency costs derived from adverse selection and moral hazard varies and therefore explains the
diversity of institutional arrangements when it comes to selection and appointment of judges. Second,
unlike standard accounts, institutional logic provides a rational explanation for the existence and
persistence of pockets in certain areas of the law. Furthermore, it also suggests that judicial reforms can
move in one or the other direction, depending on the particular type of agency problem to be corrected.
62
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Adverse selection problems are likely to be addressed with recognition judiciaries (reconfiguring the
judiciary to reflect social preferences) whereas moral hazard shortcomings induce a more structured
career judiciary (developing judicial councils or establishing stricter mechanisms of promotion). The
diversity of judicial reforms in the last couple of decades attests to a variety of local conditions that
reflect one or the other type of agency costs.

To be sure, we recognize that agency problems may not differ that systematically across contexts. It
may be that some of the continued divergence among systems is indeed attributable to path
dependencies from initial conditions. Our argument, though, is that the partial convergence on hybrid
models call into question “purist” descriptions now dominant in the literature.63

IV.

IMPLICATIONS

There is an institutional logic to the preference for a combination of career and recognition judiciaries in
the form of a dominant institutional design with pockets of the other available alternatives. The
advantage of combining recognition and career judiciaries is clear. It addresses agency costs by picking
the appropriate institution when adverse selection and moral hazard are the main concerns. It tends to
a more structured hierarchy with more rigid codification when moral hazard needs to be minimized,
using pockets of recognition judiciary in areas of the law that raise concerns about judicial preferences.
It favors a more politicized selection mechanism and a more diffused organization when adverse
selection emerges as the main source of apprehension, introducing pockets of career judiciary where
shirking or expropriation is socially more costly.

The hybrid system combines the benefits of both institutional solutions. It implicates both internal
(judicial) and external (mainly political) audiences. Hence a more appropriate balance of incentives is
provided, rather than focusing on a particular one. Internal audiences enhance collective reputation.
External audiences provide for opportunities to engage in individual reputation building. The
combination of both presumably reduces potential conflicts between collective and individual
reputation building as we observe in pure types. Career judiciaries tend to sacrifice individual
63

By no means we are the first to criticize or question the “purist” descriptions. However, our reasoning is
different. Most of the previous critiques focus on the inability of the “purist” description to explain a particular
jurisdiction; in other words, the argument is that generalization does not inform the discussion of a particular
jurisdiction. We take the opposite approach. We suggest that generalization provides fundamental insights to
understand the observed configuration in a particular jurisdiction. We simply believe that the generalized “purist”
description fails to do so.
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reputation. Recognition judiciaries put less weight on collective reputation. The existence of pockets
counter‐balances the standard trends. Simultaneously, the hybrid model permits different social and
professional backgrounds and diverse degrees of judicial training to coexist in the judiciary, therefore
responding in a more specific way to particular needs.

As a consequence, a hybrid system is also more accountable than each of the pure solutions. As we have
seen, it combines the accountability standards and practices of both systems. Obviously they are
combined in different degrees depending on the relevance and importance of the existing pockets, but
still they promote a more overreaching design of institutional accountability. At the same time, the
coexistence of both models permits comparisons. From this point of view, even conflicts such as those
that have emerged between constitutional (recognition) judges and supreme court (career) judges in
many jurisdictions, are welcome because they are informative and reduce the costs of enforcing
accountability. Each type of judiciary monitors the other one, thus further reducing agency costs and
exposing the shortcoming of each pure solution. In this light, conflicts of jurisdiction or skirmishes over
procedural rules are productive and help the principal detecting adverse selection and moral hazard.

Clearly a hybrid system is not all about advantages. Otherwise legal systems would expand their pockets
of institutional design infinitely and eventually all converge to a similar institutional arrangement. There
are significant costs with allowing and promoting pockets that need to be accounted for when thinking
about these institutions. For example, internal rivalries and conflicts of jurisdiction provide information
but also waste resources. They can hurt the normal functioning of the courts. A conflict‐ridden hybrid
system could be highly dysfunctional, therefore undermining appropriate lawmaking and hurting social
control.

More realistically, consistency and institutional compatibilities could be a serious concern. Take
codification. Enacting codes is more important when we have career judges and less so when we have
recognition judges. Once both coexist, it might be difficult to manage the appropriate degree of
codification, which should be high in certain areas of the law and low in others. Another example is
procedural independence. As we explained before, it should be the case that we need more
independence for recognition judges and less for career judges. When both coexist, either different
procedural rules are developed, thus creating the usual problems known in the specialized courts
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literature64 or they are uniform across courts, hence reducing significantly the benefits of having
pockets.

Our account has a number of empirical implications for comparative law, which are consistent with
general observation. First, pure recognition judiciaries will be smaller than pure career judiciaries,
because the cost of each judge is higher.65 This seems consistent with general findings in comparative
law. Second, we will never see a pure recognition judiciary do primary administrative or criminal
adjudication or mere law‐applying tasks; we will never see a pure career judiciary doing policymaking.
Administrative courts are unlikely to be staffed through recognition mechanisms, in other words. And
constitutional adjudication is almost always left only to the highest courts, formed through a recognition
model.

It is also the case that, if our theory is correct, we would never observe a hybrid with recognition for low
level courts and career for higher level. Note that one might, in theory believe this inversion of the
current practice would be a good idea, because career judges are more insulated from politics. But this
type of hybrid does not deal with agency costs and hence has not been tried.

V.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

We have constructed an original dataset to provide for some preliminary empirical testing of our theory.
The dataset includes 133 higher courts from 73 different countries; the full list of courts included in the
sample is available at the appendix (the sample includes 51 civil law countries and 22 common law
countries).66 Generally speaking, for common law jurisdictions, we include the highest court of the
jurisdiction while, for the civil law jurisdictions, we include the various high courts, since they tend to
have specialized jurisdictions and multiple high courts. For example, France has three highest courts:
the Conseil d’État in administrative law, the Conseil Constitutionnel in constitutional cases, and the Cour
de Cassation for ordinary appeals.

For each of these 133 higher courts, we collect the following information:
64
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(i)

Whether or not they have competence over constitutional review, indicated by a dummy
variable (70 courts have competence over constitutional review while 63 courts do not);

(ii)

Whether or not they have competence over judicial review of administrative acts, indicated
by a dummy variable (73 courts have competence over judicial review of administrative acts
while 60 courts do not);

(iii)

Whether the appointment mechanism to the court is mainly based on recognition or career,
as operationalized by whether the appointments are professionalized or political (111 courts
are mainly staffed with a recognition judiciary and 22 courts are mainly composed of career
judges);67

(iv)

The size of the court: when the number of justices is specified by the constitution, we use
that figure; for other courts, we have counted the current number of active judges (while
recognizing that actual size may vary slightly at any particular point in time).

We also include as control variables such as the legal family (common law or civil law), the rule of law
and control of corruption indicators of the World Bank for 200968, federalism69, bureaucratic efficiency
and ethnolinguistic fractionalization scores70, GDP per capita for 201071, population estimates for 200972
and the Doing Business 2011 rankings for contractual enforcement (quality of courts) and overall ease of
doing business.73 Due to missing data for some of these courts, we only have information about all the
variables for a smaller sample. The descriptive statistics are summarized in Table four.
<Insert Table 4 here>
Table five summarizes the basic correlations. All correlations are generally consistent with our model.
Constitutional review is positively correlated with recognition mechanisms while administrative review
is not (administrative review seems to be correlated with common law which is not surprising given they

67
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generally have no specialized jurisdictions at the apex level). Size is heavily reduced when we have
recognition judiciaries and when courts exercise constitutional review. Although there is a positive
correlation between recognition judiciaries and common law legal origin, such relationship is much less
significant than with constitutional review as our theory suggests. This correlation alone suggests a
modification of the legal origin story as the explanation for judicial structure.
<Insert Table 5 here>
To fully understand the relationships, however, a multivariate model is necessary.

Our primary

dependent variable of interest is whether the appointment to the court utilizes a predominately career
or recognition model. The independent variables include the powers of the court in administrative and
in constitutional law, and the control variables (we only include one of the World Bank’s governance
indicators since they are heavily correlated as we can see from Table five).

In terms of institutional

design, the appointment mechanism and the scope of constitutional law (in particular, the choice of
which court performs constitutional review) are likely to be decided simultaneously. As a consequence,
there might be an endogeneity problem with the powers of the court in constitutional law.74 There may
be a missing variable that explains both the choice of appointment mechanisms and whether to give the
court constitutional jurisdiction.

We start by estimating the probit regression with clustering by country (since some countries have
multiple high courts). Due to the potential endogeneity problem with regard to constitutional
jurisdiction, we estimate a bivariate probit regression for both appointment and constitutional powers
with clustering by country.75 Table six presents the regression analysis (the two simple probits are
reported as changes in probability). It shows the expected signs of the coefficients according to our
theory for constitutional jurisdiction. Notice that there is no statistically significant effect for
administrative jurisdiction on recognition mechanisms (while it has a negative impact on constitutional
jurisdiction). This non‐result may be a product of the fact that we are looking at apex courts; lower level
administrative adjudication is careerist everywhere, but some systems with a unified apex court may be

74

Notice that the same observation does not apply to administrative review since the choice of court jurisdiction in
this matter is usually not a matter of constitutional law. In most civil law jurisdictions it actually predates the
current constitution by many decades. For example, the French Conseil d’État can be traced to the Napoleonic
revolution, while the current constitution dates from 1958.
75
We use STATA 11.
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likely to assign administrative judicial review powers to the top court constituted by recognition
mechanisms.

We also observe a negative effect for the World Bank’s rule of law scores on recognition mechanisms
and constitutional powers, which could be driven by some of the jurisdictions with recognition
judiciaries that perform quite badly, such as India, Kenya, Mexico, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia and
Zimbabwe. Many of these poorly performing judiciaries are plagued with corruption, realizing the moral
hazard risk associated with the recognition model.76
<Insert Table 6 here>
The second dependent variable we analyze is the size of the court to test our conjecture that recognition
judiciaries are smaller. The independent variable is whether the appointment to the court is career or
recognition, and we include the control variables as in the previous analysis. We estimate the regression
with ordinary least squares with clustering by country (for the same reason as before).77 We argue that
the endogeneity problem in this context is less severe since, for most countries, the court size is either
independent of constitutional design (for all those courts without constitutional powers) or set after the
initial constitutional design, in many cases, by later constitutional amendment (for example, India).
However, in order to assure robustness, we also present the estimations using a 3SLS (with recognition
mechanisms and constitutional powers being the other two dependent variables and the remaining
control variables performing as instruments).78 Table seven presents the results, which indicate a strong
negative relationship between recognition systems of appointment and court size, even controlling for
common law tradition. Courts with constitutional jurisdiction tend to be significantly smaller than those
exercising administrative jurisdiction. The evidence suggests that judicial structure is explained by more

76

We also performed the analysis with the two other control variables, bureaucratic efficiency and ethnolinguistic
fractionalization scores. However, these regressions are only possible with a much reduced dataset (they exclude
all the former socialist countries in Europe). The econometric results presented on Table six are largely robust.
77
In unreported robustness checks we also run a Poisson model, which is appropriate given that we are analyzing
count data, and a negative binomial model with both delivering similar results.
78
We started with a two‐stage probit least squares estimation (the routine cdsimeq in STATA 11), but the second
stage regressions with instruments were affected by collinearity. This is not surprising since this method is only
recommended for a dataset with at least one hundred independent observations. We turned our attention to a
3SLS estimation that technically is less correct because two dependent variables are binary. However, since we
focus only on the regression with the continuous dependent variable, the estimation results seem acceptable to
us. The results on Table seven concerning the limited sample should be taken with extreme caution since the
number of independent variables is small.
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than legal tradition, as argued by our theory, and that institutional factors are important in
understanding the design of courts.
<Insert Table 7 here>
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

Our paper examines the distinction between the career and recognition judiciaries from a new
perspective. We suggest that the design of judicial institutions responds to particular agency problems,
namely adverse selection (the misalignment of preferences between the judiciary and society) and
moral hazard (shirking and expropriation by the judiciary of the benefits created by social control).

We provide evidence that certain areas of the law are better served by career judiciaries while others
are better served by recognition judiciaries. Hybrid systems try to supplement the choice of a particular
pure arrangement with some pockets of a different nature that can benefit certain areas of the law.
Constitutional law and administrative law provide two good examples. In systems dominated by career
judiciaries, constitutional adjudication tends to be assigned to recognition judges. In systems that are
primarily based on recognition, administrative adjudication tends to be decided by career judges.
Consistent with the theory, we find that constitutional courts are smaller and more likely to be
composed through a recognition mechanism; we find no statistically significant effect for administrative
courts.

A mix of a dominant system with pockets of the other pure solution seems to be an appropriate
technique to address agency problems. However, we have recognized that there are inevitable costs,
including institutional inconsistencies and incompatibilities. Conflicts between co‐existing models may
be informative and productive (in terms of helping institutional monitoring) but also can waste
resources and be dysfunctional. Pockets therefore tend to be self‐contained and are usually not
generalized to the entire court system. Rather, they are tailored to particular functions of the legal
system and special areas of the law. Because we see hybrids as responding to institutional needs, we
suspect that there will continue to be evolution in observed patters. For example, we might imagine that
all systems will eventually shift toward appointment after at least a medium‐length career (as in the
recognition model) followed by possibilities of promotion, transfer, etc. (as in the career model). This
might solve adverse selection problems on the front end while addressing moral hazard on the back
end, though it could also exacerbate other problems: late appointment with subsequent promotion
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might lead to pressures to politicize the promotion process to an even greater degree than is currently
found in recognition judiciaries.

There are two important implications of our paper for legal reform. First, we provide a useful taxonomy
to identify areas of the law that could benefit from different institutional arrangements. At the same
time, such changes should be limited and significantly constrained by the potential costs we have
enumerated. Second, in contrast with the influential literature on legal origins, our agency cost
approach is one in which judicial reform can potentially overcome historical and cultural path
dependence. If the nature of agency costs changes in a certain jurisdiction, we suggest that policy‐
makers ought to, and frequently do, respond by considering institutional reforms to the judiciary to
address the new conditions. Obviously there are short‐run costs to institutional change, including sunk
costs of human capital and institution‐specific assets. However, at minimum, our approach shifts the
explanatory focus away from institutions predetermined by fate of history into a more productive
incentive analysis with greater capacity to explain variation across time and space.

In our view, the structure of judicial institutions is not predetermined by history, although the historical
context is obviously important. Instead we see institutional structure as responding to broader
incentives within any particular jurisdiction. From a positive perspective, hybrid judiciaries have
emerged in many jurisdictions because the default regime (career or recognition) was not the most
appropriate in certain areas of the law. From a normative perspective, we suggest that hybrid judiciaries
are attractive because variation in agency costs across different areas of the law and different political
environments shape optimal institutional design in a variety of ways. Our approach thus provides a
theoretical basis for comparative law beyond categorization by legal origin.
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Table 1: American States’ Supreme Courts
STATE
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma (Civil)
Oklahoma (Criminal)
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee

COURT SIZE
9
5
5
7
7
7
7
5
7
7
5
5
7
5
9
7
7
8
7
7
7
7
7
9
7
7
7
5
5
7
5
7
7
5
7
9
5
7
7
5
5
5
5

MECHANISM OF APPOINTMENT
ELECTION
MERIT SELECTION
MERIT SELECTION
ELECTION
APPOINTMENT
MERIT SELECTION
MERIT SELECTION
MERIT SELECTION
MERIT SELECTION
ELECTION
MERIT SELECTION
ELECTION
ELECTION
MERIT SELECTION
MERIT SELECTION
MERIT SELECTION
ELECTION
ELECTION
APPOINTMENT
MERIT SELECTION
APPOINTMENT
ELECTION
ELECTION
ELECTION
MERIT SELECTION
ELECTION
MERIT SELECTION
ELECTION
APPOINTMENT
APPOINTMENT
MERIT SELECTION
MERIT SELECTION
ELECTION
ELECTION
ELECTION
MERIT SELECTION
MERIT SELECTION
ELECTION
ELECTION
APPOINTMENT
APPOINTMENT
MERIT SELECTION
ELECTION
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Texas (Civil)
9
Texas (Criminal)
9
Utah
5
Vermont
5
Virginia
7
Washington
9
West Virginia
5
Wisconsin
7
Wyoming
5
Source: Websites of the American States’ Supreme Courts.

ELECTION
ELECTION
MERIT SELECTION
MERIT SELECTION
APPOINTMENT
ELECTION
ELECTION
ELECTION
MERIT SELECTION
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Table 2: Brazilian States’ Supreme Courts
STATE

COURT
SIZE
9
15
9
19
35
43
35

Acre
Alagoas
Amapá
Amazonas
Bahia
Ceará
Distrito Federal
(Brasília)
Espírito Santo
23
Goiás
35
Maranhão
24
Mato Grosso
30
Mato Grosso do Sul
31
Minas Gerais
127
Pará
28
Paraíba
19
Paraná
110
Pernambuco
39
Piauí
17
Rio de Janeiro
179
Rio Grande do Norte
15
Rio Grande do Sul
45
Rondônia
19
Roraima
6
Santa Catarina
59
São Paulo
285
Sergipe
13
Tocantins
12
Source: Websites of the Brazilian States’ Supreme Courts.

SPECIALIZED SECTION ON
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
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Table 3: Selected European Constitutional Courts

GERMANY

FRANCE

ITALY

SPAIN

PORTUGAL

YEAR OF
CREATION

(1951)

(1958)

(1955)

(1979)

(1982)

COMPOSITION

16

9

15

12

13

8 by the
Bundestag &
8 by the
Bundesrat

3 each by
President,
Senate and
National
Assembly

5 each by
President,
Parliament and
Judiciary

4 by Congress, 4
by Senate, 2 by
Government and
2 by Judiciary

10 by Parliament
and 3 by
Constitutional
Court

TERM DURATION

12

9

9

9

9

RENEWABLE TERM

No

No

No

Yes, once (if the
previous term
was less than 3
years)

Yes, once
(before 1997),
No (after 1997)

MINIMUM
NUMBER OF
CAREER JUDGES

6

0

5

2

6
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TABLE 4: Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum

Size

118

26.75

33.56

3

250

Recognition

133

0.83

0.37

0

1

Constitutional powers

133

0.53

0.50

0

1

Administrative powers

133

0.55

0.50

0

1

Common Law

133

0.19

0.39

0

1

Federalism

133

0.26

0.44

0

1

Population

133

42.74

111.46

0.033

1188.69

GDP pc

133

25.87

30.61

0.322

186.175

WB Rule of Law

133

66.38

25.84

0.9

100

WB Control of Corruption

132

64.72

25.69

1.9

100

Mauro Bureaucratic Efficiency

73

7.38

1.74

4.33

10

Mauro ELF

83

27.11

27.66

0

90

DB Contract

127

60.02

47.97

1

182

DB Overall

127

58.54

41.31

1

172
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1
0.73
0.72
0.78
‐0.05
‐0.61
‐0.48

1
‐0.12
‐0.60
‐0.64

1
0.31
0.25

DB OVERALL

1
0.77
‐0.44
‐0.74
‐0.80

DB
CONTRACTS

1
0.98
0.74
‐0.41
‐0.73
‐0.75

ELF

BUREAUCRAT
IC EFFICIENCY

1
‐0.23
‐0.17
‐0.21
‐0.23
0.29
0.33
0.30

WB CONTROL
CORRUPTION

1
0.28
‐0.05
‐0.01
0.00
0.06
0.32
‐0.13
0.03

WB RULE OF
LAW

1
0.15
0.22
‐0.22
‐0.18
‐0.23
0.13
0.60
0.20
0.02

GDPpc

1
0.28
‐0.02
0.01
‐0.04
‐0.15
‐0.14
0.07
0.28
0.14
0.05

POP

1
0.11
0.41
‐0.01
0.10
‐0.08
‐0.14
‐0.16
0.08
0.27
0.07
0.07

FEDERAL

1
0.00
0.54
0.28
0.02
0.12
‐0.08
‐0.19
‐0.21
‐0.01
0.29
0.13
0.10

COMMON
LAW

ADM

1
‐0.49
‐0.04
‐0.73
‐0.29
‐0.01
0.03
‐0.04
0.03
0.02
‐0.17
‐0.18
‐0.03
0.09

RECOGNITIO
N

CON

SIZE
CON
ADM
RECOGNITION
COMMON LAW
FEDERAL
POP
GDPpc
WB RULE OF LAW
WB CONTROL CORRUPTION
BUREAUCRATIC EFFICIENCY
ELF
DB CONTRACTS
DB OVERALL

SIZE

TABLE 5: Correlation Matrix

1
0.61

1
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Table 6: Probit Model of Recognition Appointment Mechanisms

Constitutional
Powers
Recognition
Administrative
Powers
GDPpc
Population
WB Rule of Law
Federalism
DB Contracts
DB Overall

Probit
Recognition
[Change in
Probability]
0.34***
(0.09)

0.07
(0.05)
0.001
(0.002)
‐0.0002
(0.0001)
‐0.003*
(0.002)
0.04
(0.06)
‐0.00002
(0.0007)
‐0.0003
(0.0009)

Probit
Constitutional
[Change in
Probability]

0.62***
(0.06)
‐0.38***
(0.08)
‐0.003
(0.004)
0.002
(0.001)
‐0.003
(0.004)
‐0.03
(0.12)
0.002
(0.002)
‐0.002
(0.002)

Rho
Constant

Observations
127
Clusters
70
Pseudo R2
0.3032
Prob > Chi2
0.0068
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

127
70
0.2688
0.0000

Bivariate Probit
Recognition

Bivariate Probit
Constitutional

‐0.12
(0.24)
0.01
(0.008)
‐0.0001
(0.0009)
‐0.02***
(0.008)
0.19
(0.44)
0.002
(0.04)
‐0.005
(0.005)

‐0.86***
(0.22)
0.01
(0.008)
0.003*
(0.002)
‐0.01*
(0.009)
‐0.06
(0.29)
0.005
(0.004)
‐0.007
(0.005)

0.87***
(0.08)
2.49***
(0.75)

0.87***
(0.08)
1.27*
(0.71)

127
70

127
70

0.0002

0.0002
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Table 7: Models of Court Size
Recognition
Constitutional
Powers
Administrative
Powers
Common Law
Federalism
GDPpc
Population
WB Rule of Law
DB Contracts
DB Overall
Constant

Observations
Clusters
Pseudo R2

OLS
‐53.63***
(12.14)
‐12.29***
(3.74)
0.92
(5.49)
‐7.87**
(3.38)
1.71
(4.66)
‐0.05
(0.13)
0.01
(0.01)
0.15
(0.13)
0.04
(0.07)
0.11
(0.06)
62.3***
(21.2)

3SLS
‐73.12***
(6.87)
‐16.24***
(4.21)
2.98**
(1.21)
‐5.81***
(1.22)

112
68
0.535

112
68
0.469

‐0.1***
(0.01)

0.0001
(0.005)
0.04***
(0.008)
98.31***
(3.83)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX
LIST OF COURTS INCLUDED IN THE DATASET
COUNTRY
ALBANIA
ALBANIA
ARGENTINA
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIA
AUSTRIA
AUSTRIA
BANGLADESH
BELARUS
BELARUS
BELARUS
BELGIUM
BELGIUM
BELGIUM
BOSNIA‐
HERZEGOVINA
BOSNIA‐
HERZEGOVINA
BRAZIL
BRAZIL
BULGARIA
BULGARIA
BULGARIA
CANADA
CHILE
CHILE
COLOMBIA
COLOMBIA
COLOMBIA
CROATIA
CROATIA
CYPRUS
CZECH REPUBLIC
CZECH REPUBLIC
CZECH REPUBLIC
DENMARK
ESTONIA
FINLAND
FRANCE

COURT
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
SUPREME COURT
CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA
HIGH COURT
OBERSTER GERICHTSHOF (SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE)
VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSHOF (ADMINISTRATIVE COURT)
VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSHOF (CONSTITUTIONAL COURT)
APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
SUPREME COURT
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
SUPREME ECONOMIC COURT
COURT OF CASSATION
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
COUNCIL OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
COURT OF BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA
SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL
SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTICA
SUPREME COURT OF CASSATION
SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
SUPREME COURT
TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL
CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA
CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA
CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL
CONSEJO DE ESTADO
SUPREME COURT
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
SUPREME COURT
SUPREME COURT
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
SUPREME COURT
SUPREME COURT
SUPREME COURT
CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL
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FRANCE
FRANCE
GERMANY
GERMANY
GERMANY
GERMANY
GERMANY
GERMANY
GREECE
GREECE
GREECE
GREECE
HONG‐KONG
HUNGARY
HUNGARY
ICELAND
INDIA
IRELAND
ISRAEL
ITALY
ITALY
ITALY
JAPAN
JORDAN
JORDAN
JORDAN
KENYA
LATVIA
LATVIA
LIECHTENSTEIN
LIECHTENSTEIN
LIECHTENSTEIN
LITHUANIA
LITHUANIA
LITHUANIA
LUXEMBOURG
LUXEMBOURG
LUXEMBOURG
MACEDONIA
MACEDONIA
MALAWI

COUR DE CASSATION
CONSEIL d'ETAT
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT (FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT)
BUNDESGERICHTSHOF (FEDERAL COURT OF JUSTICE)
BUNDESVERWALTUNGSGERICHT (FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
COURT)
BUNDESFINANZHOF (FEDERAL FINANCE COURT)
BUNDESARBEITGERICHT (FEDERAL LABOR COURT)
BUNDESSOZIALGERICHT (FEDERAL SOCIAL COURT)
COURT OF CASSATION
SPECIAL SUPREME TRIBUNAL
COUNCIL OF STATE
CHAMBER OF ACCOUNTS
COURT OF FINAL APPEAL
SUPREME COURT
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
HAESTIRETTUR (SUPREME COURT)
SUPREME COURT
SUPREME COURT
SUPREME COURT
CORTE CONSTITUZIONALE
CORTE SUPREMA DI CASSAZIONE
CONSIGLIO DI STATO
SUPREME COURT
HIGH COUNCIL
SPECIAL COUNCIL
COURT OF CASSATION
SUPREME COURT
SUPREME COURT
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
OBERSTER GERICHTSHOF (SUPREME COURT)
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
SUPREME COURT
SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
COURT OF CASSATION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
SUPREME COURT
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL

40

MALAWI
MALTA
MALTA
MALAYSIA
MEXICO
MOLDOVA
MOLDOVA
MONACO
MONTENEGRO
MONTENEGRO
NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND
NIGERIA
NORWAY
PAKISTAN
PERU
PERU
PHILIPPINES
POLAND
POLAND
POLAND
PORTUGAL
PORTUGAL
PORTUGAL
ROMANIA
ROMANIA
RUSSIA
RUSSIA
RUSSIA
SERBIA
SERBIA
SINGAPORE
SLOVAKIA
SLOVAKIA
SLOVENIA
SLOVENIA
SOUTH AFRICA
SOUTH AFRICA
SOUTH KOREA
SOUTH KOREA
SPAIN
SPAIN
SWEDEN

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
COURT OF APPEAL
FEDERAL COURT
SUPREMA CORTE DE JUSTICIA
SUPREME COURT
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
SUPREME COURT OR TRIBUNAL SUPREME
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
SUPREME COURT
HIGH COUNCIL
SUPREME COURT
SUPREME COURT
SUPREME COURT
SUPREME COURT
CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA
TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL
SUPREME COURT
SUPREME COURT
CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL
SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL
SUPREMO TRIBUNAL DE JUSTICA
SUPREMO TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIVO
HIGH COURT OF CASSATION AND JUSTICE
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
SUPREME COURT
SUPREME ARBITRATION COURT
SUPREME COURT OF CASSATION
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
COURT OF APPEAL
SUPREME COURT
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
SUPREME COURT
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
SUPREME COURT
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
SUPREME COURT
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL
TRIBUNAL SUPREMO
SUPREME COURT
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SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
TURKEY
TURKEY
UK
UGANDA
UKRAINE
UKRAINE
US
VENEZUELA
ZIMBABWE
ZAMBIA

SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
FEDERAL SUPREME COURT
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
COURT OF CASSATION
SUPREME COURT
SUPREME COURT
SUPREME COURT
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
SUPREME COURT
TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DE JUSTICIA
SUPREME COURT
SUPREME COURT

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Tom Ginsburg
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
tginsburg@uchicago.edu
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